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Abstract Many conservationists contend that economic growth and conservation are incompatible goals.  Others contest this viewpoint, arguing that wealthier countries have the luxury of investing more heavily in conservation.  Under this assumption, one might expect a U‐shaped relationship between per capita wealth and the proportion of a country’s forest that is preserved over time.  This relationship, called the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), predicts the following: as per capita income increases, measures of environmental health should first decrease, then rise again after a certain point, such that the richest nation‐states should have superior environmental health.  Previously, I examined the evidence for this EKC among 35 tropical forest countries.  To do so, I introduced the use of quantile regression and spatial filtering, addressing problems of heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation common to EKC analyses.  The new application of these methods to EKC analysis revealed some evidence to suggest the presence of an EKC—that is, rich countries did appear to protect a greater proportion of their forests, a proxy measure for biodiversity.  However, a closer examination of conservation practices and environmental indicators within those countries that drove initial support suggests that wealth is not a reliable indicator of improved conservation practice.  I show that this relationship is driven by differences between countries, in particular, their habits of resource production and consumption.   Here, I build upon the prior analysis, explicitly incorporating consumption of forest products through the use of production, import, and export data.  I perform two separate analyses, one which incorporates all forest products (including wood used for fuel) and one which excludes fuelwood.  Because low income countries use more fuelwood than any other group, its inclusion reveals consumption‐driven losses at both income extremes.   However, when fuel is excluded, all evidence that being rich promotes conservation is eliminated.  Rich countries may practice preservation within their borders, but they appropriate resources from poorer countries to fuel their consumption.   These findings suggest, on one hand, that increasing prosperity may play a key role in promoting conservation, as alleviation of poverty would decrease the reliance on fuelwood for heating and cooking.  Conversely, unhindered economic growth increases consumption at the expense of global conservation.  Taken together, these findings have significant implications for both economic and conservation policies worldwide.  Simple application of the EKC theory, which suggests constant economic growth as the best practice for conservation, is clearly unwarranted.  On the contrary, these findings suggest that initial support for growth and poverty alleviation in low income countries might best be matched by policies which acknowledge limits to growth and strive for steady state economies amongst high income countries.    
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Introduction 
Economists have long championed economic growth as the cure for a multitude of global 
challenges, including any number of environmental issues, from pollution to the biodiversity 
crisis (Beckerman 1992; Weizsäcker 1997).   Quantitatively, this concept has been formalized in 
the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis (EKC).  Based on Simon Kuznets’ study of income 
inequality (Kuznets 1955), the EKC was adapted to environmental applications by Grossman & 
Krueger (1991) nearly two decades ago and has been widely tested and debated ever since.   The 
basic premise of the EKC is simple.  The theory predicts an inverted u-shaped curve: 
environmental degradation is low when income is low, increases exponentially with increasing 
wealth, but drops off again after income rises past a certain turning point.  The logic behind this 
model of environmental recovery is that wealth implies a degree of latitude; once a certain level 
of wealth is attained, people become free to prioritize and invest in the environment. 
The evidence in support of the EKC, however, has been equivocal at best.  Though a 
number of studies have demonstrated the presence of EKCs (Cavlovic et al. 2000; Grossman & 
Krueger 1991; Panayotou 1993), perhaps as many have shown results suggesting the opposite 
(Clausen & York 2008; Cropper & Griffiths 1994).  Even when support is found, that support is 
limited to situations in which the environmental degradation is reversible; the EKC is not broadly 
applicable across all environmental indicators.   Moreover, many scientists are already 
proclaiming that, as a useful theory, the EKC’s lifespan is spent.  Stern (2004) argues that the 
relationship is built upon flimsy statistical foundations, while Czech (2008) makes an even more 
foundational argument against the EKC, arguing that there is a fundamental conflict between 
economic growth and conservation, one which is rooted in the principles of thermodynamics and 
the physical limits to growth.  Nevertheless, the policy community still implements the EKC as a 
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tool in shaping the future of economics and development (Czech 2008; Stern 2004).   Moreover, 
evidence in support of the EKC suggests that, whether the relationship is valid or not, rich 
countries often appear to be exhibiting improved environmental quality.   Exploring the 
mechanisms behind this support is thus a crucial next step in understanding the nature of how 
economic prosperity (and aggregate economic growth) relates to environmental quality.   
In order to investigate the possibility that apparent evidence in support of the EKC may 
be misleading, I take as a starting point the relationship between per capita wealth and 
biodiversity, examined by Mills & Waite (2009).  They reveal some evidence to suggest the 
presence of an EKC.  That is, rich countries did appear to protect a greater proportion of their 
forests, a proxy measure for biodiversity.  However, Mills & Waite (2009) argue that this support 
is deceptive; closer examination of conservation practices and environmental indicators within 
those countries that drove the initial support suggested that wealth was not a reliable indicator of 
improved conservation practice.  I explore this illusory support more fully, testing the hypothesis 
that apparent support for an EKC for forest conservation and biodiversity may be an artifact of 
global trade practices and consumption patterns.  
Methods 
Income and forest area data.   I included in the dataset every country for which all data were 
available, resulting in a total of 88 countries across seven regions.  For each country, I 
constructed a time series spanning the period 1972 to 1992 (though some countries’ time series 
end earlier due to data availability).   I used logged real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain 
index, 1985 international prices) (Heston et al. 2002) as the measure of income.   Forest area 
estimates, F (hectares), came from the FAO Production Yearbooks (1972-1994).  
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Incorporating consumption.  Using data from the FAO ForesSTAT database, I calculated two 
measures of forest product consumption for each country: CONSNF , which excludes wood used 
for fuel, and CONSF, which includes fuelwood.  I assumed that,  Consumption = Production + 
Imports – Exports.  To calculate CONSNF, I considered production to be production of industrial 
roundwood and imports and exports to be the sum of import and export values for each of the 
following: industrial roundwood, paper and paperboard, sawnwood, wood pulp, and wood-based 
panels (all categories refer to the FAO ForesSTAT database). For CONSF, I added fuelwood 
values to each term.   
For each country, I also determined a hectare conversion factor, H, which is equivalent to 
a country’s annual timber production (m3/yr) divided by the area of forest harvested in that 
country annually (ha/yr) (data from Sohngen & Tennity 2004).   As such, H is essentially a 
measure of the efficiency of forest product extraction.  I used this conversion factor to relate 
consumption back to forest area, creating an adjusted forest estimate that predicts the amount of 
forest area I would expect each country to have in a given year if all the forest products they 
consumed were produced on their own lands (at their specific rate of harvest efficiency).  I 
assumed that FAO forest area values already reflected forest loss due to a country’s forest 
product production.  I thus used excess consumption, E, defined simply as a country’s total 
consumption less what they produce in-country (for either CONSNF or CONSF), to create 
estimates that represent the expected forest area of country i in year t after accounting for the 
entirety of that country’s consumption.  I defined this consumption-adjusted forest area, CaF, as:                                                                                                                                                                  
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.  For those countries and years where E is positive (consumption 
exceeds production), CaF is less than F, indicating that if those countries held responsible for 
producing all the forest products they consume, they would have less forest than actually exists.  
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Where E is negative (indicating that production exceeds consumption), CaF is greater than F.  
Such countries would have more forests if they were harvesting wood to fill only their own 
needs; at least some portion of their forest loss is driven by the others countries’ consumption. 
For each consumption measure (with or without fuelwood), I evaluated three metrics to 
make inferences about the role consumption plays in determining the relationship between per 
capita wealth and forest conservation:  1) excess consumption (E), which distinguishes between 
countries who act as net exporters and those who act as net importers; 2) raw gain or loss of 
forest hectarage (CaF(i,t)-F(i,t)), which describes the crude amount of forest involved in each 
adjusted estimate; and 3) extra proportional gain or loss of forests (due to consumption) 
[(CaF(i,t)/F(i,1972)-(F(i,t)/F(i,1972))], which accounts for differences in size among countries by 
converting raw areas to a proportion of the baseline (1972) forest area.   To make comparisons 
across income groups, I divided the dataset into four income categories using the World Bank’s 
1989 income classifications: low income (per capita GDP less than $545), lower-middle income 
(per capita GDP between $545 and $2200), upper-middle income (per capita GDP between 
$2200 and $6000), and high income (per capita GDP greater than $6000) (World Bank 1990).   
I modeled each metric using a general linear model (GLM).  Preliminary analysis 
revealed that a simple model, including just country specific fixed effects, GDP, and forest area, 
exhibited the best fit of any GLM model (r2=0.741).  However, as the intent of this study was to 
elucidate the specific differences between countries which drive the relationship between income 
and conservation, inclusion of country effects is detrimental, as it subsumes, and therefore 
masks, the effects of specific drivers.  Thus, in order to examine these specific drivers, I built a 
model that treats country-years as the sampling unit, excludes country effects (except as 
incorporated into errors) and instead incorporates two fixed effects: income group and region, 
  Mills 5 
and eight covariates: GDP, forest area, latitude, population density, a scaled democracy value, 
and three spatial covariates (produced using the Borcard-Legendre Principal Coordinates of 
Neighbor Matrices technique of spatial filtering to account for spatial autocorrelation amongst 
countries (Borcard & Legendre 2002).  Finally, I performed pairwise comparisons of the models’ 
estimated marginal means to identify significant differences amongst income groups. 
Results 
Tallies of per capita wood product consumption per country reveal that when fuelwood is 
not included, consumption increases with increasing per capita GDP (Fig. 1.)  Including 
fuelwood muddles this pattern (Fig. 2).   However, excess consumption, that is, consumption 
beyond what a country produces, is significantly greater in high income countries than in any 
other group (Table 1); this holds true for both consumption counts: with and without fuel. 
Consumption adjusted forest areas.   When forest areas are adjusted to account for (non-fuel) 
wood product consumption, rather than accounting only for actual forest loss due to harvest for 
domestic production, rich countries undergo the largest (negative) adjustment (Table 1).  The 
difference in raw hectarage between actual and adjusted forest areas decreases with increasing 
income; high income countries lose significantly more hectarage than any other group (p<.01).   
That is, high income countries spare their own forests, but consumption-based accounting reveals 
that they do so while consuming wood products produced from the forests of other countries.  
Similar patterns are seen for proportional forest loss.  When these losses are related back to the 
1972 forest area for each country, consumption-based accounting estimates that an extra loss of 
3.5% of high income countries’ baseline forests would be required to account for excess 
consumption that has been supplied by imported products over the span of the study (1972-1992; 
  Mills 6 
Fig. 3).   This loss is significantly greater than that estimated for lower-middle (.4%) or upper-
middle income countries (1.2%); the difference between high and low income countries is non-
significant (1.8% loss; but note that p=.061).  In hectares, given that the high income group also 
happens to contain several of the largest countries in the dataset (with correspondingly large 
average forest areas, on the order of 155-350% larger than poorer groups), a loss of 3.5% 
translates to an extra loss of 2,360,000 hectares per country, compared to 848,000 hectares, 
102,000 hectares, and 599,000 hectares for each of the low, lower-middle, and upper-middle 
income countries. 
Including fuelwood yields results that differ in several notable ways from the 
relationships described above (Table 1).  Low income countries are no longer credited with gains 
in raw hectarage.  Instead they experience losses, and these losses are not significantly different 
from those incurred in the high income group.  Further, inclusion of fuelwood amounts to 
additional proportional losses of baseline forests in the low income group, making the losses 
incurred by high and low income groups statistically indistinguishable (p=.340 as opposed to the 
tenuously non-significant relationship observed above).  
Discussion 
Consumption Eliminates Support for the EKC.  The idea that trade and consumption may 
play a critical role in EKC analyses is not new.  Rothman (1998) summarizes the case for 
consumption based approaches, arguing that what wealth really bestows is the ability of the 
wealthy to externalize the damages incurred by their consumption, thus creating apparent 
improvements in environmental indicators.  Notably, however, nearly all of the studies 
specifically examining the effects of trade seem to have focused on pollution, not resource 
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stocks.  In terms of forests, in particular, the literature has largely been limited to ethical 
discussions of forest policy choices (is it better to reduce demand, substitute other products in 
favor of wood, or import wood from other countries; Berlik et al. 2002; Dekker-Robertson & 
Libby 1998) and limited case studies (Berlik et al. 2002; Mayer et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2006). 
This study is the first to empirically examine the effects of consumption on forest 
conservation across a broad spectrum of countries.  Results indicate that incorporation of 
consumption eliminates all evidence in support of an EKC.  Rather than perform better due to 
increased fiscal freedom, the high-income countries in this study performed worse than the other 
groups.  The reasons for these trends are readily apparent when one considers the metric of 
excess consumption.  High-income countries are the only group which consume, on average, 
more wood products than they produce.  This is a prime example of weak (economic) 
sustainability.  High-income countries substitute external resources for internal ones, allowing 
them to create the illusion of sustainability within their borders while simultaneously 
contributing to the drawdown of natural capital worldwide. 
Technological Efficiency: Panacea or Pandemic?   Many have argued that eco-efficiency and 
eco technologies are the key, both to permitting continued growth amongst the rich, and to 
allowing poverty stricken nations to join the ranks of high development without raising the bar of 
consumption (too much) (Myers 2000; Pulliam & O’Malley 1996).  The findings of this study, 
on the other hand, suggest that, for conservation of forests and their coincident biodiversity, the 
truth is not so simple.   The relationship between consumption (without fuelwood) and per capita 
GDP is one of exponential growth with increasing income (Figure 1).  This comes as no surprise, 
as the expansion of consumption has often been noted as a serious consequence of affluence 
(Dietz et al. 2007; Hails et al. 2006; Myers 2000; Myers & Kent 2003).   The argument of 
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economics, however, is that this sort of growth is inherently good, and that the potential ill-
effects which might accompany it are mitigated by continual improvements in technology, 
effectively eradicating limits to growth.  In the case of the consumption-income relationship, 
then, one might argue that the obvious increases in consumption observed with affluence are 
balanced out by the vastly more efficient technologies exhibited by affluent societies.  
By including a measure of the harvest efficiency (H) of each country in my consumption 
calculations, I test one aspect of this notion.  While the data show that rich countries do, in fact, 
tend to exhibit exceptionally high levels of technological efficiency, harvesting dramatically 
more wood from each hectare of land than their poorer counterparts (Switzerland tops the list at 
485m3/ha, Chad is at the bottom with 0.55m3/ha, and high income countries exhibit average 
efficiency levels that are significantly higher than low or lower-middle income groups p<0.05), 
the data indicate that these countries are nevertheless responsible for more consumption-driven 
forest loss than any of the poorer groups.  
 Fuelwood and Poverty. The one area in which technology may provide an advantage is in 
the realm of energy supply.  When fuel is included in estimates of forest consumption, the 
average low-income country’s wood consumption increases 1427% (as compared to 17% for 
high income countries, 237% for upper-middle countries, and 1255% for lower-middle income 
countries) (Figures 1 and 2).  It is likely that these percentages are conservative, as fuelwood is 
often harvested as part of the informal economy (and potentially even illegally obtained, e.g. 
through encroachment on protected lands [van Kempen et al. 2009; Robbins et al. 2006]), 
particularly amongst the poorest of the poor.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite this 
14-fold increase, including fuel in total consumption merely levels the playing field, eliminating 
rather than reversing the consumption-income relationship observed when fuel was excluded.  
  Mills 9 
 Replacing the use of wood fuel for cooking and heating will necessarily entail an 
alleviation of poverty, making this a prime policy objective for relieving consumption pressure 
on global forests from the low-income end, and suggesting at least one instance where poverty 
reduction and conservation may be readily compatible goals (Adams et al. 2004). However, 
reduced poverty brings with it a slew of attendant detrimental effects related to increased 
consumption (Myers & Kent 2003; Rothman 1998), and, given current trends, there is little 
reason to expect that today’s developing countries will choose to forego increased consumption 
as they become more affluent and more developed (as of 2003, Cuba was the only country to 
exhibit both high human development and an ecological footprint below fair earthshare (Hails et 
al. 2006).  Neither is it particularly reasonable to expect this, given the consumptive habits of 
already developed nations.  Working downward, from the high-income end of the wealth 
spectrum, a different prescription becomes apparent: consumption must be reduced.  
Trickle-down Economics Re-envisioned. Naturally, reducing consumption is clearly far 
easier said than done; it will require a wholesale change in the direction of economic thinking 
and individual preferences.  Nonetheless, this study joins a growing body of scientific work in 
arguing that such a move is no less than a necessity if we intend to conserve our limited natural 
capital.   Just as important as recognizing the need for change is determining how to pursue it.  I 
posit that two key ideas may be instrumental in deliberations on this directive: 1) Responsible 
consumption should be place-based. 2) Wealth, as we know it, must be redefined. 
As several authors have pointed out, free trade enables countries to export environmental 
damage to places outside their borders, and to export with it any awareness of, or responsibility 
for, the damages incurred  (Berlik et al. 2002; Dekker-Robertson & Libby 1998; Mayer et al. 
2005, 2006; Muradian & Martinez-Alier 2001).   Responsible consumption, then, may start with 
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domestic production.  Policy makers should reexamine the benefits of regulation and move 
toward policies which promote self-sufficiency, that is, living off of the biocapacity available 
within one’s own country, rather than absorbing extra capacity from others.  Critics may argue 
that such a move would be an injustice to the poor, making it more difficult for them to increase 
their wealth and thereby escape poverty.  While this may be accurate in the short run, the long 
term effects would be to curb the export of natural resources from low income countries, leaving 
them with more natural capital on which to build a (strongly) sustainable future.   
In conjunction with such a move comes the necessity for a new formulation of wealth. 
Arguments have long been made that GDP falls far short in terms of describing human well-
being, and a variety of indicators have been proposed to redefine the concept of wealth. Such 
indicators have shown that while GDP nearly doubled over the past several decades, progress has 
remained stagnant, and countries with higher GDP tend to experience less satisfaction per unit of 
consumption (NEF 2006; Talberth et al. 2007).   Conflating progress with economic growth thus 
fails to achieve valuable progress while also endangering ecological stability. 
Adoption of the view that well-being is more important than material wealth would free 
policy makers from all nations to address pressing human and ecological concerns, rather than 
focusing on continued growth.  Such a stance would address not only the need for decreased 
consumption from the top-down, but also the desire, and indeed profound human right, for 
increased development from the bottom-up.  Finally, in tandem with place-based policies, re-
envisioning wealth would provide a framework in which human society might work within 
ecological limits to creatively circumvent the conflict which pits growth against the environment, 
thereby encouraging both progress and the strong, ecologically-based sustainability that will 
carry us into the future.   
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Figure 1. Per capita consumption of wood products (excluding fuel wood), CONSNF, as a function of per 
capita GDP.  Each country’s time series (1972-1992) is denoted by a unique color and symbol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Per capita consumption of wood products (including fuel), CONSF, as a function of per capita 
GDP.  Each country’s time series (1972-1992) is denoted by a unique color and symbol. 
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Figure 3.   Excess gain (positive values) or loss (negative values) of forest area attributable to countries as 
a result of accounting for consumption of forest products.  Values are relative to extant forest area in the 
base year, 1972.  Vertical bars divide the x-axis into four income groups from left to right: low, lower-
middle, upper-middle, and high.  Horizontal bars indicate observed means for each group. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Income-dependent differences in the impact of wood product consumption, both including and 
excluding fuelwood.  Estimated marginal means and significance (as compared to high income countries) 
are presented for three metrics of consumption-based accounting.  ** indicates significance at p<.01 
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